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have no injunctive power,38
 whereas the Board would. 38 As this limitation
does not extend to actions against employers," the employee would have
free access to the courts.
A further implication of the case might be that the individual employee
would have standing, under section 301, to sue the union for breach of the
contract. In deciding whether to classify his complaint as a contract viola-
tion or an unfair labor practice, the complainant would consider the tradi-
tional judicial requirement of exhaustion of internal remedies, 4 ' which is not
required in complaints to the Board." In such a suit it would seem that any
injunctive jurisdiction of the court would not be beyond the reach of in-
dividual employees against the union, as such actions by individuals would
not be "a part and parcel of the abuses against which the Act was aimed." 43
Nevertheless, while there may be decided exceptions to the desirability
of employees using the courts to bring suit against an employer, they are just
that—exceptions. There can be little doubt that this new weapon of em-
ployees, and thereby of unions, against management shall be utilized in the
enhancing of their bargaining position. What is definitely still in doubt is
whether and where the courts will mark off the access of employees to sec-
tion 301. The use of Evening News to answer this is limited.
PAUL E. D'HEDOUVILLE
Negotiable Instruments—Due Date of Note—Effect of Acceleration
Clause in Mortgage.—Poultrymen's Service Corp. v. Brown. 1—A promis-
sory note payable to the order of the plaintiff 120 months after date was
Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
RO 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1958).
40 Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. B. & 0. R.R., 310 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1962).
41 See Parks v. IBEW, 52 L.R.R.M. 2281, 2311 (4th Cir. 1963) and Detroy v.
American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75, 77-78 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
929 (1961) holding that Section 101(a) (4) of the Landrum-Griffin Act:
No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to institute an
action in any court, or in a proceeding before any administrative agency, irre-
spective of whether or not the labor organization or its officers are named as
defendants or respondents in such action or proceeding, or the right of any mem-
ber of a labor organization to appear as a witness in any judicial, administrative,
or legislative proceeding, or to petition any legislature or to communicate with
any legislator: Provided, That any such member may be required to exhaust
reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time)
within such organization, before instituting legal or administrative proceedings
against such organizations or any officer thereof: And provided further, That no
interested employer or employer association shall directly or indirectly finance,
encourage, or participate in, except as a party, any such action, proceeding, ap-
pearance, or petition.
limits the jurisdiction of the court. Compare Sheridan v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 306
F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1962), holding that the four months proviso was directed only to the
unions. In view of the legislative history indicating an intent to retain judicial discre-
tion, and those decisions using the rationale of Detroy to establish an absolute right to
sue after four months, the Sheridan approach seems the better interpretation. See 105
Cong. Rec. 16414 (1959).
42 LMRA § 10(i), 61 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 101(1) (1958).
43 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, supra note 26.
1 77 N.J. Super. 198, 185 A.2d 706 (Ocean County Ct. 1962),
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executed simultaneously with a mortgage to secure the note. The mortgage
contained a default clause to the effect that failure to pay taxes upon the
mortgaged lands within thirty days after they became due allowed the holder
of the mortgage the option of declaring the entire amount secured by the
mortgage due and payable. The mortgage referred to the note which it
secured, but the note was devoid of any mention of the mortgage. Subse-
quently, upon the arrearage of taxes, the plaintiff notified the defendants of
his election to accelerate the debt. The taxes were paid (thereby restoring
the mortgage),2
 but suit was still commenced for recovery upon the promis-
sory note, plaintiff contending acceleration by the breach of the default clause
in the mortgage. HELD: The mortgage and the promissory note were two
distinct instruments, and in the absence of any reference in the note to the
mortgage, the breach of a condition in the mortgage has no effect upon the
note. To hold that they are one instrument and one contract for purposes of
interpretation would allow the terms of the note to be varied by extraneous
instruments contrary to the theory of negotiable instruments.
On the main issue of this case, under the common law and the Negotiable
Instruments Law, there exists a very decisive split of authority.3 As in the
principal case, the courts holding against non-inclusion of provisions of a
mortgage simultaneously executed with a note do so largely on the theoretical
grounds that the two instruments are separate and independent legal entities,
each designed to fulfill a particular role in the overall financing transaction.'
The note is intended as evidence of a personal obligation and the manner of
payment, while the mortgage is to serve as a security device in specific
property.6 Under this viewpoint each instrument is to stand by itself, and
2 The court in a foreclosure suit, being an action in equity, views the mortgage as
restored upon performance of the accelerating condition. This equitable defense was held
inapplicable to the note because it is an action at law. While this technical distinction
made by the court is certainly correct, it could be contended that defenses available to
a party upon one instrument should likewise be available to the party upon the incorpo-
ration of this instrument into another—the basis of the present suit. Furthermore, the
trend is to incorporate the principles of equity within actions at law. E.g., the law of
restitution is now such an action. Therefore, the court could have easily decided this
controversy by applying the same equitable defense to the note.
3 As to the jurisdictions holding the particular viewpoints and a listing of the many
cases, see Brannon, Negotiable Instrument Law 173-75 (6th ed. 1938); Norton, Bills and
Notes 109 (4th ed. 1914) ; for further citations, see Comments in 13 Cornell L.Q. 432
(1928), 9 N.C.L. Rev. 201 (1930), 4 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 203 (1930), 2 Wis. L. Rev. 469
(1924), 26 Mich. L. Rev. 436 (1928).
4 A note and a mortgage securing the same are separate instruments, distinctly
differing in their nature and purpose. The debt evidenced by the note is the
principal thing, and the note is governed by the Iaw merchant, while the mort-
gage is simply an incident, and governed by the law of real property.
White v. Miller, 52 Minn. 367, 372, 54 N.W. 736, 737 (1893). See also, Winne v. Lahart,
155 Minn. 307, 193 N.W. 587 (1923); Owings v. Mackenzie, 133 Mo. 323, 33 S.W. 802
(1896).
5 A mortgage need not be accompanied by a personal obligation on the part of
the mortgagor to repay the sum for which the mortgage was given. The consid-
eration for the mortgage may have been advanced only on the security. . . .
Manifestly there could be no deficiency judgment in such a case as that. If
the mortgagee is not content to rely on the security alone, he must obtain a
special promise for the payment of the debt, and, if the promise is contained in
a note, he can only enforce it in accordance with the terms of the note.
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consequently the provisions in the mortgage are viewed as being applicable
only for the recovery of the debt by foreclosure proceedings against the prop-
erty. The promissory note is considered to be governed exclusively by its own
terms.°
Furthermore, some courts maintain that the requirements of uncertainty
in the date when the debt is due and the unconditionality of the promise
to pay would be varied to such an extent by incorporating the terms of
the mortgage that the note would not be a negotiable instrument. There-
fore, the allowance of the external conditions, according to this view, causes
the instrument to become nonnegotiable."' Faced with the alternative of
either interpreting the instruments as one contract, as would be dictated by
the doctrine that instruments executed at the same time and having one
purpose are but one instrument, or of following the historical belief that a
negotiable instrument is a mercantile specialty, "a courier without luggage,"
these courts uphold the integrity of the note and reject all the conditions in
an accompanying instrument as having any effect upon the note. This is
basically the theory adopted by the court in the principal case and in the
courts which follow this line of reasoning.
On the other hand, the courts favoring inclusion of the mortgage acceler-
ation clause in the note do so on the general basis that between the original
parties at the time of execution the instruments are in essence one contract. 8
As one contract, both instruments are to be interpreted to determine the
intention of the parties. As to the negotiability of the note when interpreted
with respect to the mortgage, the courts are subdivided. Some courts view
the incorporation of the mortgage provisions into the note as destroying the
negotiability of the instrument„ 8
 while other courts assert that this incorpo-
ration, since only applicable to the original parties and to persons holding
with notice, does not destroy the negotiability.'° The negotiability is not de-
Winne v. Lahart, supra note 4, at 312, 193 N.W. 587, 589. See also, Shanabarger v.
Phares, 86 W. Va. 64, 103 S.E. 349 (1920), and cases cited note 4 supra.
0 The stipulation in the mortgage should be construed as providing a remedy
on the mortgage, and that so far as foreclosure proceedings are concerned, the
notes for that purpose are due, but for general purposes, the obligations on the
notes, are to be determined by their own expressed terms. In this way both
contracts can stand and be fully enforced according to the manifest intention of
the parties.
McClelland v. Bishop, 42 Ohio St. 113, 124 (1884). See also, Cafritz Constr. Co. v. Mud-
rick, 59 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1932) ; Smith v. Nelson Land & Cattle Co., 212 Fed. 56
(8th Cir. 1914).
7 Birken v. Hickey, 42 S.D. 472, 483, 176 N.W. 137, 140 (1920). See also, Iowa
Nat'l Bank v. Carter, 144 Iowa 715, 123 N.W. 237 (1909) ; Baird v. Meyer, 55 N.D. 93,
215 N.W. 542 (1927).
8 Chambers v. Marks, 93 Ma. 412, 9 So. 74 (1891) ; McCormick v. Daggett, 162
Ark. 16, 257 S.W. 358 (1924) ; Webster v. 759 Riverside Ave., 113 Fla. 8, 151 So. 276
(1933) ; San Antonio Real Estate, Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Stewart, 27 Tex. Ciy, App.
299, 65 S.W. 665 (1901) ; Wilson v. Kirchan, 143 Wash. 342, 255 Pac. 368 (1927).
0 Iowa Nat'l Bank v. Carter, supra note 7; Brooke v. Struthers, 110 Mich. 562,
68 N.W. 272 (1896) ; Cornish v. Wolverton, 32 Mont. 456, 81 Pac. 4 (1905).
10 Webster v. 759 Riverside Ave., supra note 8; Des Moines Say. Bank v. Arthur,
163 Iowa 205, 143 N.W. 556 (1913) ; Holliday State Bank v. Hoffman, 85 Kan. 71, 116
Pac. 239 (1911) ; Durham v. Basco, 30 N.M. 16, 227 Pac. 599 (1924). See also, Aigler,
Conditions in Bills and Notes, 26 Mich. L. Rev. 471, 492-93 (1928).
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strayed in the opinion of the latter courts since the instrument is to be in-
terpreted by the terms written upon its face unless the parties agree that it is
subject to conditions contained in another instrument." In effect this posi-
tion is the middle ground between the two extremes, allowing the note to be
affected by simultaneous instruments and also maintaining the negotiability
of the note when it enters commerce unaccompanied by the "conditional"
instrument. This position is clearly the most logical position to rectify the
opposing requirements of the probable intent of the parties, the practices of
the commercial world, and the freedom of negotiability.
This is in brief the status of the authority in the United States prior to
the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code. The Code's treatment of
negotiable instruments, while incorporating many of the provisions of the
Negotiable Instruments Law, has attempted to solve the split of authority
existing in this area. Under the Code one aspect of the Poultrymen's Service
case which was not considered to be crucial becomes of primary importance
—the parties to the suit were the original parties to the instrument. The
Code provides in section 3-119(1) that between the original parties and
persons taking with notice, the negotiable instrument may be modified or af-
fected by any written agreement executed as a part of the same transaction.
The rationale for this position is based on the assumption that between the
original parties the negotiable instrument and the allied instruments are
one contract. 12
 As one contract the court must consider all the written in-
struments in interpreting the terms of the contract. Furthermore, the final
governing factor in the court's interpretation of this integrated contract is to
be the intent of the parties gathered from the instruments themselves. 13 In
this manner, between the original parties, the terms of a negotiable instru-
ment may be intentionally modified, explained and conditioned by diverse
clauses contained in accompanying instruments, while the face of the ne-
gotiable instrument is devoid of terms except those required by the formalities
of negotiability.
While the above would appear to relegate the consideration of negotia-
bility or non-negotiability to minor significance, section 3-119(2) provides
that a separate agreement does not affect the negotiability of an instrument.
Therefore, even though contemporaneous writings may be read together
under subsection (1), the negotiability of the note will not be affected, such
11
 The purpose of the mortgage was to afford security for the payment of the
note, and all the conditions in the part quoted, except one, relate to the protec-
tion and preservation of the security. These have no bearing on the engagements
contained in the note. While the note and mortgage are to be construed together
whenever the nature of the transaction becomes material, this does not mean
that the provisions of the mortgage are thereby incorporated into and become
part of the note.
Des Moines Say, Bank v. Arthur, supra note 10, at 211,143 N.W. 556, at 558-59.
12 See Comment 3 to UCC 3-119.
is UCC § 3-119, Comment 3:
[Al note may be affected by an acceleration clause, a clause providing for
discharge under certain conditions, or any other relevant term in the separate
writing. 'May be modified or affected' does not mean that the separate agree-
ment must necessarily be given effect. There is still room for construction of
the writing as not intended to affect the instrument at all, or as intended to affect
it only for a limited purpose . . .
.1.11n•••11-
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being exclusively determined by "what appears on the face of the instrument
alone" If the instrument thus explicitly states that it is subject to or gov-
erned by separate writings, it is not negotiable. 15 In this manner the Code
maintains a separation between the problem of collateral instruments quali-
fying the terms of negotiable instruments and the problem of collateral in-
struments destroying the negotiability of the negotiable instruments.
In the principal case the court was not required to interpret the Code, 16
but it attempted to utilize section 3-119(2) and comment 5 thereto to aug-
ment its position against inclusion of the mortgage clause. The use of this
subsection and comment was a misapplication of the Code to the facts of the
case. Since the Code, as previously shown, establishes a separation between
the problems of negotiability and inclusion of simultaneous instruments, the
rationale that a note would lose its negotiability by incorporating other in-
struments within itself cannot be maintained under the Code. Nevertheless,
in transactions involving immediate parties, there is still one basis by which
the courts can sustain a holding that the terms of simultaneous instruments
may not be included within the terms of the note—the intention of the
parties. The courts in interpr&ing this intention may conclude that by not
placing the provisions in the note itself, the parties did not intend the note
to be governed by the clauses of the mortgage.'?
In conclusion, the Code provisions demand that the jurisdictions decide
anew whether or not, between the original parties and persons holding with
notice, the acceleration clause in an accompanying mortgage will affect the
terms of the note. The decision reached by these courts is also required to
be based upon a fact determination of the intent of the parties and can no
longer be founded upon the destruction of negotiability theory.
ROBERT T. TOBIN
Securities—Sale of Stock by Minority Shareholders—Effect of SEC Rule
10b-5 on Insider Activities.--Cochran v. Charming Corp.'—Action by
minority shareholders against the dominant corporate stockholder and the
directors of Agricultural Insurance Company for a violation of SEC Rule
10b-5 and New York tort law. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant, Channing
Corp., engaged in a scheme aimed at obtaining the shares and control of
14 Comment 5 to section 3-119 states that the key is the formality of the note.
15 Ibid. The comment adds that "if it merely refers to a separate agreement or
states that it arises out of such an agreement, it is negotiable." See UCC § 3-105 and
comments thereto. The Permanent Editorial Board has recommended an addition to
§ 3-105(1)(c). A promise or order will not be made conditional by the fact that the instru-
ment "refers to a separate agreement for rights as to ... acceleration." Rep. No. 1,
Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC (1962). -
16 The UCC became effective in New Jersey on January 1, 1963.
17 This interpretation of the intent of the parties may be weak if the mortgage
makes any reference at all to the note's inclusion of the mortgage terms. Since all the
instruments are viewed as one contract, and the parties are deemed to intend the usual
meaning of words used in contracts which they sign, the conclusion would appear to be
that the parties' intent was to incorporate the acceleration clause within the note.
1 211 F. Sapp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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